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Abstract— The banking institutions worldwide, 
including banks in emerging Asia have been 
operating in more challenging and more uncertain 
environment after the 2007 financial calamity. In 
ensuring an optimal functioning of the banking 
sector, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) highlighted the importance of effective 
corporate governance in the banking sector.  
Observing from the suggestion for banks to reform 
their corporate governance, this study is conducted to 
examine the relationship between risk governance 
mechanism and bank performance. Using a sample of 
109 banks with 545 observations in eight Asia 
emerging economies for a period of 2011-2015, it is 
evidenced that risk governance mechanism is 
significantly and positively related with bank 
performance represented by its liquidity. Therefore, 
risk governance is vital for banks betterment in Asia 
emerging market to weather future negative effects as 
well as to restore and maintain their resilience.  
Keywords— Corporate Governance, Risk, Banking, Asia, 
Emerging Markets   
1. Introduction 
Financial services industry touches the lives of 
every individual, household and business within the 
economy of a country [1]. Apparently, banking 
performance of a country does have a major impact 
on the country’s economic performance including 
countries in Asian emerging markets that have 
bank-based financial systems. A consultative 
document by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) (2014) underlined that banks’ 
well-being and soundness are key to financial 
stability, and the system in which they conduct 
their businesses, therefore, is fundamental to 
economic strength [2].  
A statement from Chief Economist of the World 
Bank in June 2014 indicated that the recent 
2007/2008 global financial turmoil is not 
completely over and banks worldwide must be 
more vigilant in years to come. It was also 
highlighted by BCBS (2014) [2] on the importance 
of corporate governance in ensuring an optimal 
functioning of the banking sector. The banks must 
not only improve its efficiencies compared to their 
competitors but must also be able to know which 
corporate governance practices will improve their 
performances as well as be able to weather the 
external conditions.  
One of the main significant reforms that 
highlighted by BCBS emphasis on risk 
management. This governance mechanism was 
proposed by BCBS as one of the corporate 
governance principles. In view of that, the 
importance of the professed “risk governance” for 
banks in emerging markets given that the typical 
governance measures in most of the previous 
studies on corporate governance and its valuation 
effect in non-financial corporations, may be 
inadequate in describing the relevant governance 
structures of banks [3]. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Risk Governance in Banking 
In a report of OECD Steering Group on Corporate 
Governance emphasized that prime responsibility 
of board is to ensure the integrity of the 
corporation’s systems for risk management [4]. It 
was concluded that the financial turmoil can be 
attributed to imperfections in corporate governance 
arrangements which did not serve their purpose to 
safeguard against excessive risk taking in several 
financial institutions. Referred to a private sector 
report of Institute of International Finance in 2008 
which insisted for a need to re-emphasize the 
respective roles of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and the board in the risk management 
process, apart from a solid risk culture throughout 
the firm [4]. The report made several pertinent 
suggestions to reinforce board management of risk 
issues; the boards need to be educated on risk 
issues as well as to be given the means to 
understand risk appetite and the firm’s performance 
against it. A few members in the risk committee (or 
equivalent) should be individuals with technical 
financial sophistications in risk disciplines or with 
solid business experience giving clear perspectives 
on risk issues.  
The risk management or risk committee is vital in 
ensuring that the conflict of interest between the 
shareholders (with a diversified portfolio who are 
normally risk seeker) and the managers who are 
risk averse is managed through more efficient 
board monitoring [5]. This can make certain 
managers do not simply avoid profitable but risky 
projects that may improve shareholders’ value and 
also certifies that risks from diversification or non-
focused strategy are well-managed. This also in 
line with the goals of the international institutions 
such as BCBS, OECD and the European Union 
(EU) to specifically insert risk governance in their 
guidelines to improve bank corporate governance. 
In this regards, banks in Asia emerging countries 
must explore more applicable risk managements 
that are vital for them differs from for non-bank 
organizations. It is also consistent with Hasan and 
Dridi (2010) who concluded banks which did not 
have efficient risk management implementations 
during the 2007 financial crisis encountered poorer 
financial flaws after the financial disaster as against 
the banks with better risk management practices 
during the financial catastrophe [6].  
Apart from the above-mentioned report that 
strongly suggested for a requirement to re-
emphasise the respective roles of the CEO and for a 
solid background of risk committee (or equivalent) 
in risk management practices of banks, the 
suggestions for a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) who 
should be part of a bank’s executive board and 
oversees all relevant risks within the bank are also 
raised [7-9]. Hence, the establishment of a separate 
risk committee together with the appointment of a 
specific officer-in-charge (preferably at director’s 
level) of risk management in a bank is of utmost 
importance. Apparently, there are no earlier 
researches that examined the relationship between 
the appointment of CRO and performance of banks 
except dissertations by [10], [11] notwithstanding 
growing number of banks that appoint CRO or 
equivalent, in tandem with recommendations by 
BCBS. Most of the existing studies such as [12], 
[13] only took the establishment of risk committee 
without considering the risk committee’s 
characteristics in their model specification. 
2.2 Risk Governance Mechanisms and 
Bank Performance 
 
Investigated the presence of a CRO in the executive 
board of a bank [10]. They employed buy-and-hold 
returns of banks’ stocks, ROA as well as ROE as 
their measurements to gauge the performance of 
banks. Based on their empirical findings, 
throughout the financial calamity, the stock returns 
do not differ significantly between banks with and 
banks without a CRO in the executive Board. 
However, [11] discovered that the presence of CEO 
in banks was significantly related to better bank 
performance. The contribution of decisions and 
recommendations from risk committee is 
significant towards advancements of the banks’ 
performances, particularly during financial 
meltdown. In addition, [12] discovered that the 
establishment of separate risk committee 
significantly influences performance and market 
valuation of banking institutions. Hence, CRO in 
banks who implemented stronger risk management 
mechanisms might contribute to banks better 
performance level. However, most of the existing 
studies such as [12], [13] only took the 
establishment of risk committee without 
considering the risk committee’s characteristics in 
their model specification. The next section 
discusses the specific risk governance framework 
in relation to bank performance. 
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2.2.1 Size of Risk Committee  
 
[3] discovered that banks with larger risk 
committee achieved better profitability but in 
contrast, they revealed that size of risk committee 
was negatively associated with market valuation 
and the expected market growth of banks (Tobin's 
Q and price earnings ratio). This indicates that the 
market identifies a “really functioning risk 
committee” for banks should constitute small 
number of members but with frequent effective 
meetings. Correspondingly, [14] also concluded 
that control and risk committee which is 
responsible for internal control activities should be 
smaller so as to enhance performances of banks. 
The most recent study highlighted that a larger risk 
committee is desired for more effective control 
mechanism [15]. Furthermore, member of larger 
risk committee would consist of those with varied 
expertise for effective oversight. Therefore, it paves 
way for rising vigilance over board decisions as 
well as activities and consequently, leading to 
escalated banks’ profitability. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship 
between size of risk committee and bank 
performance. 
2.2.2 CRO Gender  
 
[16] discovered that the presence of women board 
and executives decreased bank risk during financial 
crisis. As for the full-time period of their sample, 
bank risk also declined as the percentage of women 
on the audit committee and corporate committee 
increased. [17] opined that since directors are 
obliged to make decisions in the best interest of 
their corporation while considering viewpoints of 
multiple stakeholders, having a significant portion 
of female directors may produce more effective 
decisions because they have highly developed 
Complex Moral Reasoning (CMR) skills than male 
directors. The above positive impact of CRO 
gender might also in agreement with [18] who 
suggests that female directors have more diligent 
approach to the monitoring role via membership on 
related corporate governance committee together 
with audit committee [18]. Based on those 
evidences, the hypothesis is constructed as follow:
  
H2: There is a significant positive relationship 
between female CRO and bank performance. 
2.2.3 CRO Nationality 
[19], [20] found that nationality diversity is 
positively related to firm performance. The 
presence of foreign board members promotes well-
organized monitoring as well as reduces managerial 
entrenchment and agency costs in a company. In 
contrast, [21] discovered that local CROs 
contribute to better bottom lines of corporations 
under review. Instead of examining the impact of 
CRO appointment alone on bank performance, 
their background including their nationality are 
indeed vital to ensure their better contributions on 
better corporate governance practices and 
ultimately, banks’ enhanced performance. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship 
between local CRO and bank performance. 
2.2.4 Reporting Line of CRO  
 
In the multivariate analysis, [10] discovered that 
banks in which the CRO reports directly to the 
board of directors performed significantly better 
during the credit crisis than other banks in which 
CRO did not report directly to their boards. This 
signifies that risk governance in general together 
with line of reporting of the CRO specifically, were 
vital to the banks’ crisis performance. The 
empirical results is consistent with many earlier 
qualitative papers that emphasised the importance 
of an effective reporting line from CRO to the 
Board, namely [22], [8]. On the contrary, banks in 
which the CRO reports to the CEO instead, 
performed significantly worse which might 
conform to the argument by [10] that a CEO might 
have a different agenda than a CRO, which 
possibly neglecting the prominence of effective risk 
managements. Moreover, the CEO might also over 
emphasize the assets growth without a defined risk 
appetite strategy. Their findings were 
corresponding with [11] who discovered overall 
results that efficient and independent risk 
management functions including characteristics of 
CRO and risk committee, can restrain tail risk 
exposures at banks and possibly enhance value as 
well, predominantly during crisis years. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
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H4: There is a significant positive relationship 
between reporting line of CRO and bank 
performance. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The population for this study is derived from 
selected listed banks from emerging Asia countries. 
A number of eight countries are selected 
generalized from definitions of various 
organization such as IMF, Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE), Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI), Standard & Poor's (S&P) and 
Dow Jones. These include banks from China, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines, 
Thailand and Taiwan. A total of 109 listed banks 
with 545 observations are chosen for data 
collection. Since this study intends to evaluate the 
impact of corporate governance post 2007 financial 
calamity, data collection encompasses 2011 until 
2015. Data for bank performance (liquidity) and 
audit committee were taken from the banks’ 
respective annual reports. In addition, 
BANKSCOPE database and the related central 
banks’ websites are the sources of data for the 
control variables. 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
Bank’s solvency and its ability to meet debt 
obligation can be measured by liquidity ratio. A 
higher liquidity ratio indicates an assured margin of 
safety for the debt coverage. According to [23], 
liquidity ratio is also an indicator of the ability of 
the bank to meet short-term withdrawal 
requirement of depositors. The ratio which includes 
the liquid assets over customer’s short-term 
funding as a liquidity proxy is also accounts for 
deposits ran off.  
3.3 Independent Variable 
The risk management practices and risk monitoring 
of banks is largely depending on the effectiveness 
of its Chief Risk Officer and risk committee. 
Therefore, risk governance mechanism in this study 
is represented by four variables namely size of risk 
committee (SRC), gender of Chief Risk Officer 
(CROGEND), nationality of Chief Risk Officer 
(CRONAT) and reporting line of Chief Risk 
Officer (CROREPORT). 
 
3.4 Control Variable 
Evidently, the banks in Asian emerging economies 
must not only improve its competences and 
corporate governance practices over their 
competitors but they must also be able to weather 
the macroeconomic and other external conditions 
since banks are also affected by the outer factors. 
There is a consensus that macroeconomic stability 
is critical for the growth of banking institutions in 
reference to [24]. The variables are log of total 
assets (LnASSET), Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
volume of bond and sukuk (BONDSUK), money 
supply (MONEYSS) and stock exchange index 
(STOCKEXCHG). Consequently, bank-specific 
determinants together with external factors are 
essential to measure a bank’s performance. The 
following Table 1 provides the compositions and 
definitions of measurements all variables:  
Table 1. Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Liquidity Ratio Liquid assets over 
customer’s short-term 
funding  
Annual 
Report 
Size of Risk 
Committee (SRC) 
CRO Gender 
(CROGEND) 
 
 
 
 
 
CRO Nationality 
(CRONAT) 
Reporting Line of 
CRO 
(CROREPORT) 
Total number of 
directors on the risk 
committee  
A binary variable at 
value of one if a bank 
appointed a female 
CRO. A zero value 
given if a bank 
appointed a male CRO. 
A binary variable at 
value of one if a bank 
appointed a local CRO. 
A zero value given if a 
bank appointed a 
foreign CRO. 
A binary variable at 
value of one if the CRO 
or any person-in-charge 
of risk-related affairs in 
a bank, reported directly 
to the board. A zero 
value given if the CRO 
or the person-in-charge 
did not have direct 
access to the board but 
only reports to CEO  
Annual 
Report 
 
Annual 
Report 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
Report 
 
Annual 
Report 
LnASSET 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Log of Total Asset 
CPI as inflation proxy 
derived as percentage of 
annual change during the 
selected period 
Bankscope 
Volume of Bond 
and Sukuk 
 
 
Total volume for new 
issuance of bond and     
sukuk during a particular 
year, in the respective 
Bankscope 
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Money Supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stock Exchange 
Index 
banks’ operating 
countries. 
Annual percentage 
changes of national 
money supply, which 
comprises currency in 
circulation and demand 
deposits of the private 
sector, plus other deposits 
of the private sector 
placed with commercial 
banks, Islamic banks and 
other banking institutions 
Annual changes of stock 
market returns (in 
percentage) for an 
economy 
 
 
Bankscope 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bankscope 
 
3.5 Empirical Model 
The model in this study is constructed to test the 
impact of risk governance mechanisms on bank 
performance measured by its liquidity. The model 
is specified as follow: 
Yit =  β0 + β1SRCit + β2CROGENDit + 
β3CRONATit + β4REPORTCROit 
+ β5BLnASSETit + β6CPIit + 
β7BONDSUKit + β8MONEYit + 
β9STOCKEXCHGit + εit 
Where;   
Yit  Bank performance 
SRC  Size of Risk Committee 
CROGEND CRO Gender 
CRONAT CRO Nationality 
CROREPORT Reporting Line of CRO 
LnASSET Log of Total Assets 
CPI  Price Index  
BONDSUK Total volume for issuance of 
bond and sukuk 
MONEY Money supply  
 
STOCKEXCHG Stock exchange index 
 
Pooled panel data analysis involve with cross 
sections (refers to different banks) and time series 
[25-27]. Panel data models scrutinize individual-
specific effects, time effects or both in order to deal 
with heterogeneity or individual effect (cross-
sectional or time-specific effect) that might be or 
might not be observed. The analysis is conducted 
on the premise of a balanced panel due to constant 
and repeated number of years for all the cross-
sectional data. Using this method has advantages in 
dealing with heterogeneity of variables with less 
collinearity, reduced bias and better degree of 
freedom. According to [28], longitudinal or pooled 
data analysis is effective in studying change.  
4. Findings 
The number of selected banks from eight Asia 
emerging economies for this thesis is 109 of which 
details are as per Table 2. India and Indonesia are 
represented among the highest numbers of banks of 
27 and 25 respectively based on data availabilities. 
Table 2. The demographics of nominated banks in 
Asia emerging markets 
Country Num. of selected banks 
Malaysia 12 
Taiwan 25 
India 27 
Philippine 11 
Thailand 9 
China 13 
South Korea 5 
Total 109 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 and 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics 
of this study. It is observed that majority of the 
banks in emerging Asia had five members in their 
risk committees whilst the minimum number of 
committee was nil given that all banks in Taiwan 
did not form such committee. Based on the data 
collected for this study, majority of banks in the 
selected nations prefer male and local CROs with 
92.11% are male. The tendency in appointing local 
CROs is quite high at 73.21%. Corporate 
governance practices in terms of reporting line of 
the CRO in the selected banks are satisfactory 
judging by almost 60% of their CROs report 
directly to the board of directors rather than to their 
CEOs. Concerning the banking performance 
measures, the mean of liquidity ratio for the banks 
under review was 0.44. Regarding total assets of 
the banks, the mean size was USD139 billion 
whilst the median was USD25 billion. The asset of 
the largest bank during period under review was 
USD3.35 trillion whereas the size of the smallest 
banks was USD0.0038 billion. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Continuous 
Variables 
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Liquidity 0.44 0.41 0.16 1.17 
SRC 5 5 0 14 
Ln(Asset) 139 25 0.0038 3350 
CPI 4.03 4.00 -0.90 9.90 
MONEY 11.46 12.00 0.00 18.30 
BONDSUK 277.52 40.75 17.10 2316.63 
STOCKEXCHG 5.68 4.1 -27.10 55.07 
 
Pertaining to the external and macroeconomic 
variables of the banks in Asia emerging countries, 
the mean and median of CPI were both 4% 
respectively. Meanwhile, the mean for new 
issuance of bond and sukuk in the selected eight 
economies was USD277.52 billion which was 
substantially different from the median which was 
only USD40.75 billion. This figure encompassed 
both government and private bond issuances. 
Furthermore, the mean for annual changes of 
money supply was 11.46%. Regarding capital 
market measures, the mean for annual changes of 
stock market index for the eight countries was 
5.68%.   
4.2 Regression 
Table 4 summarizes the regression results between 
Risk Governance mechanisms and liquidity. All 
four corporate governance mechanisms under the 
category have significant and positive relationship 
with liquidity. Concerning size of risk committee, 
this model disclosed that performance of bank 
improved with more members of risk committee. 
[3] Battaglia and Gallo (2015) also discovered that 
banks with larger risk committee achieved better 
profitability. In contrast, this finding is inconsistent 
with Romano et al. (2012) [14] which reported 
significant negative association between size of risk 
committee and bank performance.  
It is noteworthy that CRO gender is positively 
associated with liquidity, signifying that banks 
which had female CROs performed better than 
their counterparts that employed male CROs. This 
might indicate that female CROs were better in 
strategizing and implementing corporate 
governance in the banks. 
Regarding CRO nationality, the result of this study 
indicates that the appointment of local CROs in the 
emerging Asia banks contributed to their better 
bottom lines.  This might be attributed by the more 
familiarity of local CROs with the local industry 
situations and structures as against the foreign 
CROs.  
Table 4. Regression of Risk Governance on 
Liquidity 
SRC 0.006657*** 
 (0.0000) 
CROGEND 0.040439* 
 
(0.0547) 
CRONAT 0.076406*** 
 
(0.0000) 
REPORTCRO 0.013312** 
 
(0.0373) 
Ln(Asset) -0.026071 
 
(0.0308) 
CPI -0.001490 
 
(0.2877) 
Ln(Bondsukuk) 0.041384 
 (0.0016) 
ln(MoneySS) 0.028080 
 (0.0000) 
StockExc 0.001532 
 (0.0228) 
Constant 0.167248 
 (0.0378) 
Obs 545 
Adjusted R2 0.137297 
***, **, * denote significance of 1%, 5% and 10% 
significant level respectively. 
 
As for reporting line of CRO, this result is also in 
line [10], [22], [8] that discovered banks in which 
the CRO reports directly to the board of directors 
performed significantly better than other banks, in 
which CRO did not report directly to their boards.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
All four corporate governance mechanisms under 
risk governance in this study are significantly and 
positively related with liquidity. This is in 
agreement with the most contemporary 
requirements or suggestions for banks to reform 
their risk governance implementations to enhance 
the banks’ achievements. Based on the evidence 
from this study, the banks in Asia emerging 
economies must reform their corporate governance 
practices, particularly on risk governance. The 
banking institutions worldwide, including banks in 
emerging Asia have been operating in more 
challenging and more uncertain environment after 
the 2007 financial calamity. Such measure is vital 
for banks betterment in Asia emerging market to 
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weather future negative effects as well as to restore 
and maintain their resilience.  
There are several limitations pertaining to the 
methodology of this study. Firstly, the sample of 
this study only covers public listed banks in Asia 
emerging countries. The number of selected banks 
or banking groups is only 109 since this sample 
excludes the purely Islamic banks or Islamic 
banking groups as well as listed banks with 
unavailable information. Secondly, this study has 
adopted BCBS’ Principles for enhancing corporate 
governance (2010) together with preceding relevant 
literatures for the main guidelines. Therefore, these 
guidelines may not be the only applicable sources 
and there could be other relevant sources that may 
add, support or contradict the base of this research. 
This study proposes for future study to expand the 
population samples, including global samples with 
a longer period. In fact, future research could use 
similar model to compare bank performance in 
emerging countries against performance of banks in 
developed economies. Secondly, similar model and 
approach could also be employed to compare 
performance of the conventional banks with 
Islamic banks in the same eight countries. 
Following the importance of diversity in the 
structure of governance, future study may also 
consider CRO’s education, experience, tenure and 
risk committee’s independence level in the model 
specification.  
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